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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
with the discretion of the trustee during the duration of the
trust estate." 54

The underlying theory behind this and the previous decisions
under this statute is, the trustee retains his common law powers, but
in any case where a power is inconsistent with the statute, the courts
will hold the common law right fails and the statute prevails. It
has been asserted that, since this right was unknown to the common
law, he has only those powers which the statute gi'es him. In view
of the cases, this assertion seems to be erroneous. In future cases
arising under this section as to whether or not the trustee retains
a common law power, the answer will be found in the answer to
the question: Is the retention of the common law right inconsistent
with the statute?
Conclusion.
A trustee has implied authority to lease the trust property. A
lease based on this implied power is valid only so long as the trust
continues. The trustee can lease for a term to extend beyond the
trust by consent of remaindermen, express authority or statute.
Under the statute, a lease for a term of five years or less will bind
the remainder if the trust should terminate before the expiration of
the five years; or, the trustee can lease for a longer term by securing
the approval of the court. After securing the approval of the court,
he has no authority to modify the terms of the lease, without a E'ke
approval by the court, but courts will not advise and direct trustees
as to business questions.
LEO F. BOLAND.

LIABILITY OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS FOR NUISANCE.

"A municipality being not only a public agency but also, a quasiprivate individual is therefore subject to the law. For its wrong to
the public it may be prosecuted; for its torts against individualsv it
may in the proper case be sued in civil action for damages like a
private corporation. 1
To formulate a rule as to the liability of a municipal corporation for tort is impossible. This condition is not only due to the
" Supra note 3, at 399.
143 C. J. 920; Conrad v. Ithaca, 16 N. Y. 158 (1859); Healy v. New York,
3 Hun 708 (1857).

NOTES AND COMMENT
diversity of judicial determinations but also to the dual functions of
the municipality.2 With reference to the liability of a municipal corporation for tort, it assumes a dual role, one public and the other
private, and accordingly it exercises twofold functions and duties.
One class of its powers is a public and general character to be exercised in virtue of certain attributes of sovereignty delegated to it for
the welfare and protection of its inhabitants. The other relates only
to special or private corporate purposes for the accomplishment of
which it acts not through its public officers as such, but through
agents or servants employed as such.3 A municipal corporation in

its exercise of police power performs a governmental function.4 But
in its operation of a subway it performs a proprietary or non-governmental function.5
The state unless it assumes liability is not liable for torts committed by its officers or agents; this exemption rests upon the fiction
that the state is the sovereign and the sovereign can do no wrong.
This exemption is also extended to municipal corporations in the discharge of municipal or governmental functions. 6 Thus in Wilcox
v. City of Rochester 7 -where an action was brought to recover damages for the negligence of persons having control of an elevator in
a police station building in the City of Rochester the court held the
municipality not liable on the ground that in maintaining a police
station, it was exercising a governmental function.
While it is difficult to formulate a rule embracing all the torts
for which a municipality may be liable, yet it is believed that the
following formula is accurate and complete.8 "So far as municipal
corporations of any class and however incorporated exercise powers
conferred upon them for purposes essentially public, purposes pertaining to the administration of general laws made to enforce the
general policy of the state, they shall be deemed agencies of the state
and not subject to be sued for any act or omission occurring while
in the exercise of such power unless by statute the action be given.
In reference to such matters they should stand as the sovereignty
whose agency they are, subject to be sued only when the state by
'PRASHKER, OUTLINE OF THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1927)
§§106, 107.
3Lloyd v. New York, 5 N. Y. 369 (1851); Barton v. Syracuse, 36 N. Y.
54 (1867); Davenport v. Rushman, 37 N. Y. 568 (1867); McCarthy v. City
of Syracuse, 46 N. Y. 194 (1871) ; Regal v. Rochester, 45 N. Y. 129 (1871) ;
Maximillian v. New York, 62 N. Y. 160 (1875) ; Ring v. Cohoes, 77 N. Y. 83
(1879) ; Noonan v. Albany, 79 N. Y. 470 (1879).
'Woodhull v. New York, 150 N. Y. 450, 44 N. E. 1083 (1896).
Sinsheimer v. Underpinning and Foundation Co., 178 App. Div. 495, 165
N. Y. Supp. 645 (1st Dept. 1917).
aMurtha v. N. Y. H. M. Col. and Flower Hospital, 228 N. Y. 183, 126
N. E. 722 (1920)1 Smith v. State of New York, 227 N. Y. 405, 125 N. E. 841
(1920); Pauchogal Land Corp. v. L. I. State Park Commission, 243 N. Y. 15,
152 N. E. 493 (1926).
"190
N. Y. 137, 82 N. E. 1119 (1907).
8
Twyman v. Frankfort, 117 Ky. 518, 78 S.W. 446 (1918).
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statute declares that they may be.9 In so far, however, as they exercise powers not of this character, powers intended for the private
advantage and benefit of the locality and its inhabitants there seems
to be no sufficient reason why they should be relieved from
liability." 10
The municipality has consistently been held liable for the torts
of negligence and nuisance committed on the streets or highways
within its territorial limits " the theory behind it being that although
the legislature has primarily control of the highways of the state 12
it has delegated to the municipal corporations the duty of maintaining
them within their territorial bounds.13 In performing that duty of
maintaining streets and keeping them reasonably safe for public
travel, municipal corporations act as an arm of the state performing
a delegated function. 14 In performance of that duty they act in a
quasi-private or corporate capacity. 15 Having undertaken to act
the law requires that they act with reasonable care and if they fail
to act and their failure to act causes injury they may be liable to
the individual. 16
The power conferred upon a municipality to prevent, remove, or
abate a nuisance is generally held to be a power for the public good
and not for the private corporate advantage and therefore the municipality cannot be held liable for failure to enact ordinances to prevent or abate nuisances or for the acts or omissions of its officers
with respect to the enforcement of such ordinances. 1 7 Where the
nuisance is not created or maintained by the express authority of
the municipality and is not the result of any act or omission in the
'Smith v. Rochester, 76 N. Y. 506 (1879); Lynch v. New York, 76 N. Y.

60 (1879); Missano v. City of New York, 160 N. Y. 123, 54 N. E. 744
(1889); Hughs v. Auburn, 161 N. Y. 96, 55 N. E. 389 (1899); Lefrois v.
Monroe County, 162 N. Y. 563, 57 N. E. 186 (1900); Mullen v. Middletown,
187 N. Y. 37, 79 N. E. 836 (1907); Herman v. Union District School No. 8,
234 N. Y. 201, 137 N. E. 24 (1923); Metzroth v. City of New York, 241
N. Y. 470, 150 N. E. 519 (1926); Murtha v. N. Y. H. M. Col. and Flower
Hospital, supra note 6; Oakes Mfg. Co. v. New York, 141 App. Div. 130,
125 N. Y. Supp. 1030 (2d Dept. 1910), aff'd. 206 N. Y. 221, 99 N. E. 540
(1912); Berger v. Solvay, 156 App. Div. 440, 141 N. Y. Supp. 995 (4th
Dept. 1913); Finkelstein v. New York, 183 App. Div. 539, 169 N. Y. Supp.
718 (1st Dept. 1918).
" Sammons v. Gloversville, 175 N. Y. 346, 67 N. E. 622 (1903) ; Garden v.
Silver Creek, 127 App. Div. 888, 112 N. Y. Supp. 54 (4th Dept. 1908).
'Maximillian v. Mayor, supra note 3; Missano v. Mayor, supra note 9;
Wilcox v. City of Rochester, supra note 7.
Bradley v. Dignon Contracting Co., 224 N. Y. 60, 120 N. E. 89 (1918).
" Village Law 141; Cons. Laws Ch. 64 (1909).
'xGhu v. Northern Gas Co., 158 N. Y. 510, 53 N. E. 692 (1899) ; Matter
of McCoy v. Apgar, 241 N. Y. 70, 150 N. E. 546 (1926).
'Supra note 11.
"14 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1892) §1217.

"Cain v. Syracuse, 99 Hun 105, aff'd, 95 N. Y. 83 (1884) ; Leonard v.
Homesville, 41 App. Div. 106, 58 N. Y. Supp. 106 (4th Dept. 1889); White v.
Buffalo, 131 App. Div. 531, 115 N. Y. Supp. 1021 (4th Dept. 1909).
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performance of any duty imposed by law, it cannot be held liable,
as where nuisances are maintained on private property and in no
way amount to an obstruction of the public street nor imperils the
safety of travelers in such street.' 8 On the other hand it has been
held that the municipality is liable for failure to abate a nuisance in
or near the street which endangers travelers lawfully in the street
or for authorizing the commission of acts on private property which
are forbidden by ordinance and are carried out under the supervision
of municipal officers in such a manner as to constitute a public
nuisance. 19
Where a municipality creates or permits a nuisance by nonfeasance or misfeasance it is guilty of tort and like a private corporation or individual and to the same extent is liable for damages
in a civil action to any person suffering injury therefrom, irrespective of the question of negligence, 20 and such liability cannot be
avoided on the ground that the municipality was exercising governmental power. 21
The power to organize and maintain a fire department for the
prevention of damages by fire is a public or governmental function
and a municipality will not ordinarily be liable, unless the statute so
provides, for the negligent acts or omissions of its departmental
employees in performance of their duties.2 2 The maintenance of a
Stubley v. Allison Realty Co., 124 App. Div. 162, 108 N. Y. Supp. 759
(1st Dept. 1908); Klepper v. Seymour House Corp., 212 App. Div. 277, 209
N. Y. Supp. 67 (3d Dept. 1925). But see Swentzel v. Holmes, - Mo. -,
175 S. W. 871 (1915) (holding that where a party wall rendered dangerous by a fire collapses and injures persons other than the owners, the
city is liable for its negligence in failing to abate the nuisance).
" Walker v. City of New York, 107 App. Div. 351, 95 N. Y. Supp. 121
(2d Dept. 1905).
'Weet v. Brockport, 16 N. Y. 161 (1857); Seifert v. Brooklyn, 101
N. Y. 136, 4 N. E. 321 (1886); Cohen v. City of New York, 113 N. Y. 532,
21 N. E. 745 (1889); Danaher v. Brooklyn, 119 N. Y. 241, 23 N. E. 745
(1890) ; Stoddard v. Saratoga Springs, 127 N. Y. 261, 27 N. E. 1030 (1891);
Speer v. Brooklyn, 139 N. Y. 495, 34 N. E. 727 (1893); Hill v. City of New
York, 139 N. Y. 495, 34 N. E. 1090 (1893); Herman v. Buffalo, 214 N. Y.
316, 108 N. E. 451 (1915) ; Ahriens v. Rochester, 97 App. Div. 480, 90 N. Y.

Supp. 744 (4th Dept. 1904); Lyman v. Polsdam, 173 App. Div. 390, 159 N. Y.
Supp. 71 (3d Dept. 1916); Davies v. Jagger, 197 App. Div. 196, 180 N. Y.
Supp. 789 (2d Dept. 1921); Briggs v. No. Tonawanda, 213 App. Div. 781,
210 N. Y. Supp. 643 (4th Dept. 1925).
'Supra note 10. But see Finkelstein v. City of New York, 183 App. Div.
539, 169 N. Y. Supp. 718 (1st Dept. 1918) (holding that although a municipality which owned the fee of the land on which a jail was situated, allowed
the wall of the buildings to depreciate that it became unsafe by reason of
falling of bricks and constituted a nuisance the municipality was not liable for
injuries resulting from the nuisance since it was discharging a governmental
function in respect to the jail).
'Smith v. Rochester, 76 N. Y. 506 (1879) ; Smith v. City of New York,
203 N. Y. 106, 96 N. E. 409 (1911) ; Gaetjens v. City of New York, 132 App.
Div. 394, 116 N. Y. Supp. 759 (2d Dept. 1909); Fraser v. City of New York,
156 App. Div. 495, 142 N. Y. Supp. 1118 (1st Dept. 1913); see Terhune v.
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municipal water system where the city supplies the same to consumers for compensation will render the municipality liable to perreason being that it is a proprietary function and
sons injured, the 23
not governmental.
The mere granting to another of a license or permit to do some
act which in itself is not unlawful will not as a general rule render
the municipality liable for injuries caused by the performance of such
act.24

Where the municipality by its affirmative act authorizes the

use of the streets for a carnival or a display of fireworks or any
other public exhibition or amusement intrinsically dangerous or constituting a public nuisance it will be liable for injuries to travelers
caused thereby.2 5 It has been held that a grant of permission for
the holding of a horse show will not render the city liable for any
injury for a horse show is not intrinsically dangerous. 26 An exhibition of wild animals in the streets, however, did render the city
liable on the nuisance theory as well as the granting of permission
of an inherently dangerous act.2 7

It has been held that a display

of fireworks in the28street is not a nuisance as a matter of law but is
a question of fact.

There has been much dissension and diversity of opinion in
various jurisdictions as to the function and necessary corollary, tort
liability, of parks and playgrounds maintained by municipal corporations. In 1892 the Supreme Court of the United States said in
Shoemaker v. United States: 29 "In the memory of men now living
a proposition to take private property without the consent of the
owner for a public park and to assess a proportionate part of the
cost upon real estate benefited thereby would have been regarded as
a novel experience of legislative power. It is true that in the case
of many of the older cities and towns, there were commons or public
grounds, but the purpose of these was not to provide places for exercise or recreation but places on which the owners of domestic animals
might pasture them in common, and they were generally laid out as
a part of the original plan of the town or city. It is said that
Central Park of New York Was the first place deliberately provided
for the inhabitants of any city or town in the United States for exCity of New York, 88 N. Y. 247 (1882)

(holding that the city was not liable

to persons dismissed by the fire department).

'Oakes v. City of New York, 206 N. Y. 221, 99 N. E. 540 (1912);
Caravan v. City of Mechanicville, 229 N. Y. 473, 128 N. E. 822 (1920)
(municiapl corporation held guarantor of water); see In re Certain Lands in
City of New York, 217 N. Y. Supp. 544 (1926) (use of land for a municipal
market is for a proprietary and not a governmental purpose) .
'Masterson v. Mt. Vernon, 58 N. Y. 391 (1874); Darlon v. Brooklyn,
43 Barb. 604 (1870).
'Landau v. City of New York, 180 N. Y. 48, 72 N. E. 631 (1906).
'Mt. Vernon v. Aldridge, 74 Ind. 309, 128 N. E. 934 (1921).
'Little v. Madison, 42 Wis. 643, 6 N. W. 249 (1880).
Melker v. City of New York, 190 N. Y. 481, 83 N. E. 565 (1908).
147 U. S. 282, 13 Sup. Ct. 361 (1892).
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clusive use as a pleasure ground for rest and exercise in the open
air. However that may be, there is scarcely now a city of any considerable siie that does not have or has not projected such parks."
One can see of how comparatively recent origin municipal parks are,
which accounts for the little litigation on the subject.
Some jurisdictions have adopted the so-called liability rule and
the municipality has been held liable for injuries caused by negligence in the maintenance of such parks and playgrounds and the
equipment therein, 30 the liability being based expressly on the ground
that the maintenance of such premises is not a governmental but a
corporate duty.31 In the Van Dyke case, 32 the municipality was
held liable on the ground that it had extended an invitation to children
to use the playground and having done so an obligation rests upon it
to protect children of tender years and inexperience at least from its
own negligence. It is not liable however for dangers not reasonably
to be anticipated 3 nor is it liable for injury to a trespasser nor to
a licensee on land which the legislature has released from park purposes. 34 Moreover, a municipality is not required to keep every
part safe for public travel. "Certain parts of a public park should be
kept in a safe condition for public travel but there are often in such
a park ponds, lakes, knolls, ravines, and forests not intended and not
understood by the public to be intended for public transit." 35
Other jurisdictions have adopted the non-liability rule, holding
that municipal parks and playgrounds are for the sole benefit of the
public and not for the profit of the municipality and hence it is not
liable at common law for injuries due to the defective condition or
negligent maintenance of such property.30 If such property is main' Silverman v. City of New York, 114 N. Y. Supp. 59 (1909) ; Gorhman
v. City of New York, - App. Div. -, 164 N. Y. Supp. 59 (1st Dept. 1917);
Van Dyke v. Utica, 203 App. Div. 26, 196 N. Y. Supp. 277 (4th Dept. 1922);
Cleveland v. Nerrando, 114 Ohio St. 207, 150 N. E. 747 (1926).
"Van Dyke v. Utica, supra note 30; Gartland v. N. Y. Zoological Society,
135 App. Div. 163, 120 N. Y. Supp. 24 (1st Dept. 1909).
'Supra note 30. But see Vanderford v. Houston, 97 Tex. Cr. R. 100,
286 S.W. 568 (1926). Here the court said, "An invitation to parents to permit
children to visit a park imposes no liability on the municipality for injury to
young children and an acceptance of such invitation carries with it an assumption of the risk of danger to children incapable of protecting themselves."
"Sarber v. Indianapolis, 72 Ind. A. 594, 126 N. E. 336 (1920). Where a
municipality in connection with its park system assumed control over a river
and the river at that point was used for boating, not bathing, the municipality
was bound only to exercise care commensurate, with the dangers likely to
occur and to be anticipated from use of the park as place for boating.
'Durkin v. City of New York, 146 App. Div. 472, 131 N. Y. Supp. 275
(2d Dept. 1911).
'Holt v. Moline, 196 Il. A. 235.
"Epstein v. New Haven, 104 Conn. 283, 132 AtI. 467 (1926); Keller v.
Los Angeles, 179 Cal. 605, 178 Pac. 505 (1919) ; Kerr v. Brookline, 208 Mass.
190, 94 N. E. 257 (1911); Brisbing v. Asbury Park, 80 N. J. L. 416, 78 AtI.
196 (1911); Boyland v. New York, 3 N. Y. Super. (1 Sandf.) 27 (1847);
Bernstein v. Milwaukee, 158 Wis. 576, 149 N. Y. 382 (1915).
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tained primarily as a source of revenue the municipality is liable.3 7
The non-liability rule does not apply where the municipality knowingly permits a public nuisance in a park likely to cause such injury.38
In Vanderford v. Houston 39 the court said, "This rule of exemption
should not apply where the municipality knowingly permits such
nuisance or condition to exist in a public park or other places where
it is likely to cause injury In such a case it should not be held that
the city, in creating or knowingly permitting the nuisance or dangerous condition to exist, was exercising a governmental function." It
is interesting to note that this state 40 upholds the non-liability theory
on the ground that in maintaining a park the municipality is exercising a governmental function.
New York has in some cases adopted the liability theory 41 and
in others the non-liability theory.42 The most recent authority on
this subject in this state is the case of Whittaker v. Village of Franklinville.43 In that case, residents of the village were celebrating the
Fourth of July in a small park in the village. In the display of their
patriotism they made use of a bonfire, fireworks, and a home-made
cannon. The plaintiff while in an automobile on an adjoining street
was seriously injured, being struck by a piece of the cannon which
burst when fired off. Two trustees of the village were present at
the celebration. In precluding the plaintiff a right of recovery the
court justified its decision on the ground that maintenance of the
park was a quasi-private function and since the city did not receive
compensation for the use of the same they may not be held liable
even though two of the trustees had knowledge of the same. Crane
and Crouch, JJ., dissented without opinion.
With all due respect to the learned court the writer cannot concur in its opinion. Granted that an exhibition of fireworks in the
park does not constitute a nuisance per se,44 can it be said that a
hand-made cannon was not a nuisance as a matter of law? Its inherent dangerous character is exhibited and demonstrated by the
very accident which occurred and injured the plaintiff in an adjoining street. Such being the case, the plaintiff should have been allowed
a recovery on the theory that where a municipality permits a nuisance
by nonfeasance or misfeasance it is guilty of tort and is liable irrespective of the question of negligence. 45 Can it be said that the trustees were not negligent in maintaining a passive acquiescence when
the cannon was being fired? But a recovery may be upheld on
Cornelisn v. Atlanta, 146 Ga. 416, 91 S. E. 415 (1917) ; sipra note 23.
' Vanderford v. Houston, supra note 32.
" Ibid.
, Texas.
"2 Supra note 30.
Boyland v. New York, supra note 36.
'3265 N. Y. 11, 191 N. E. 716 (1934).
"Melker v. City of New York, 19 N. Y. 481 (1859).
"Supra note 20.

NOTES AND COMMENT
another theory which has been adopted in other jurisdictions, namely,
where the municipality knowingly permits such nuisance to exist
in a park or in any other place where it is likely to cause injury,
there should be no exemption from liability to the municipality. 46
This contention is also supported in the case of Cleveland v. Ferrando,47 similar to the case at bar on all fours. It was held there
"that in failing to remove the explosive that was left on the ground
with knowledge of the same and of its dangerous character the
municipality should be held liable. The presence of an unguarded,
unexploded bomb in a public park where children are invited to come
is in itself an intolerable nuisance and so self-evident that any argument can but echo the statement." At any rate, the rule 48 adopted
in the other non-liability jurisdictions seems to be the more logical
and just, as well as the more favorable to public policy.
IRVING L, KALISH.

RIGHT OF PRIVACY-CIVIL RIGHTS LAW,

§§50, 51.

During the last half century, courts of jurisprudence have generally been reluctant to recognize the existence of the so-called right
of privacy as an individual and personal right.' This behavior on the
part of the courts may be attributed, to a large extent, to the apparent
infringement of such right upon the rights of freedom of speech and
of the press, 2 or to their strict adherence to established precedents
"Supra note 32.
' Supra note 30.
It is interesting to note that in New York, if an express
license or permit had been given, the plaintiff would have been allowed a
recovery, but in this case the court says if an express license had been given,
the fireworks exhibition would then have been under the regulation of the
police, and in such case the municipality would be exercising a governmental
function in which case they were exempt from tort liability.
,Supra notes 45 and 46.
' Infra notes 5 and 6. The following cases have rejected the legal right of
privacy altogether: Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 Fed. 982
(W. D. Mo. 1912); Atkinson v. Dougherty, 12 Mich. 372, 80 N. W. 285
(1899); Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442
(1902); Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N. Y. 382, 165 N. E. 819 (1933) ; Somberg
v. Somberg, 263 N. Y. 1, 188 N. E. 152 (1933); Henry v. Cherry, 30 R. I. 13,
73 Atl. 97 (1909); Hillman v. Star Pub. Co., 64 Wash. 691, 117 Pac. 594
(1911) ; see Von Thodorovich v. Franz Josef Ben. Assoc., 154 Fed. 911 (E. D.
Pa. 1907).
'-Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box Co., supra note 1. But see Pavesich
v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190,.50 S. E. 68 at 74, where Justice
Cobb said: "Liberty of speech and of the press is and has been a useful instrument to keep the individual within the limits of lawful, decent, and proper
conduct; and the right of privacy may well be used within its proper limits to
keep those who speak and write and print within the legitimate bounds of the
constitutional guaranties of such rights; one may be used as a check upon the
other; but neither can be lawfully used for the other's destruction."

